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(As the text indicates in various places, a version of this essay is now a chapter in a book: 
Lester, J. C. 2016. Arguments for Liberty: A Libertarian Miscellany. Buckingham: The 




This essay is intended to be a refutation of the main thesis in Against Intellectual Property, 
Kinsella 2008 (hereafter, K8). Points of agreement, relatively trivial disagreement, and 
irrelevant issues will largely be ignored, as will much repetition of errors in K8. Otherwise, 
the procedure is to go through K8 quoting various significantly erroneous parts as they arise 




This text uses the new libertarian paradigm that is non-morally liberty-based, 
ultimately pre-propertarian, and critical-rationalist: that is, of liberty as the absence of 
interpersonal proactive impositions, of their minimisation in the event of clashes, and the 
explicitly conjectural nature of this theory and its desirability in practice.
2
 This clashes with 
the old libertarian paradigm, which is mainly rights-based, ultimately (physical-)propertarian, 
and justificationist; as is found in the essay being criticised here. 
 
The errors and their correction 
 
K8 states that intellectual property (IP) rights “at least for patents and copyrights, may be 
considered rights in ideal objects” (14). And that seems to be clear enough. But then K8 goes 
on to assert that 
 
A‟s ownership of ideal rights gives him some degree of control—ownership—over 
the tangible property of innumerable others. (15) 
 
This is a fundamental confusion. To own an “ideal object” (or abstraction, or meme) is to 
have control over its use. If someone tries to use that “ideal object” in some way (such as by 
making goods based on it) without its owner‟s consent, then a defence of its ownership may 
ensue. That defence is not asserting any kind of “ownership—over the tangible property of 
innumerable others.” By analogy, if someone has ownership of his own body, or land, or any 
physical thing, then he might defend that ownership from other people using their own bodies 
or external properties to use it without his consent. And neither is that defence asserting any 
kind of “ownership—over the tangible property of innumerable others.” Despite explicitly 
referring to “intellectual property”, K8 is implicitly presupposing that only physical things 
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 As found, for instance, in Lester [2000] 2012, 2011, 2014, and Forthcoming. The exact form of words does not 
matter, but it must be possible to express interpersonal liberty (in the intuitive sense of „people not initiating 
constraints on each other‟) in some adequate form of words, as the old paradigm fails to do. The formula chosen 
here is intended to reflect the idea that the relevant constraints must be somehow initiated (rather than defensive 
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can really be property and that any so-called IP is really about imposing limits on, or 
interfering with, „real‟ physical property (PP). 
However, there is a grain of truth in what K8 states, and it is this: to make anything 
into private property (whether physical, including self-ownership, or intellectual) is usually 
thereby to proactively impose at least very slightly on some other people: being denied free 
access can be a new disutility. But if we assume that such ownership is universalised, then 
those other people, in their turn, are also able to enjoy the benefits of private property. And in 
this way it is a lesser proactive imposition (i.e., a lesser interference with liberty) to allow 
(imposition-minimising) private property (whether physical or intellectual) than it is to deny 
it. Therefore, it is mistaken to view such private property (whether physical or intellectual) as 
“invasion” (36) or “trespass” (47) when it exists solely in order to minimise these things. K8 
partly perceives and greatly magnifies the minimal imposition in IP but does not see any of 
the similar minimal imposition in PP. This is because K8 has adopted a purely physical-
propertarian view as inherently „libertarian‟ without having any explicit theory of liberty to 
explain this. 
K8 immediately repeats this error but goes on to add more when it states that 
 
Patent and copyright invariably transfer partial ownership of tangible property from 
its natural owner to innovators, inventors, and artists. (15) 
 
The idea of a “natural owner” is some sort of appeal to natural law. Perhaps natural law 
exists, and perhaps it is libertarian. But to cite it appears to be to adopt a natural law theory 
rather than an explicitly libertarian theory, i.e., a theory that explains the relationship to 
interpersonal liberty. Moreover, if there is a “natural owner” for some “tangible property” (by 
whatever explanation), then there ought also to be a “natural owner” for „intangible property‟ 
(by a parallel explanation). And who must any “natural owner” be if not one of the 
“innovators, inventors, and artists” that produced it? Again, K8 is expressing a mere physical-
propertarian presumption. 
 K8 goes on to assert that “Pro-IP arguments may be divided into natural-rights and 
utilitarian arguments” (16). What K8 overlooks here is that “Pro-IP arguments” can also 
include explicitly libertarian arguments: arguments that relate to liberty as such. And by 
asserting that “Libertarian IP advocates tend to adopt the former justification” (16, emphasis 
added) K8 is also overlooking the critical rationalist epistemology that can put IP as a 
libertarian conjecture for explanation and defence from criticism rather than any futile 
attempt at a “justification.” This is because a putative justification implicitly and erroneously 
presupposes that it is possible to give epistemological support to a theory in a way that 
transcends a web of assumptions (or conjectural framework).
3
 Hence, while there is no 
justification, it is still possible to conjecture and explain that there can be liberty-based IP, 
that it can promote „utility‟ or general welfare (and libertarian „natural rights‟ too), and then 
consider any criticisms that purport to show that it does not. But K8 is only arguing here that 
there are “fundamental problems with justifying any right or law on strictly utilitarian 
grounds” (20, emphasis added). As justifications are not possible, K8 is right, but not for the 
reasons it advances. 
 In the later discussion about “Property and Scarcity” K8 tells us that 
 
as libertarians recognize, following Locke, it is only the first occupier or user of such 
property that can be its natural owner. Only the first-occupier homesteading rule 
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provides an objective, ethical, and non-arbitrary allocation of ownership in scarce 
resources. (30) 
 
This, again, seems to be referring, without any theoretical explanation, to natural law in its 
reference to a “natural owner”. So it seems to be about natural lawyers that merely, and 
mysteriously, self-identify as “libertarians”. In fact, the “first occupier” rule does 
approximate to what is libertarian. But in order to see this one needs to have a theory of 
interpersonal liberty, such as „not being proactively imposed on‟. Then it follows that 
allowing the “first occupier” to have a property claim will slightly proactively impose on 
non-“first occupiers” who now have to go elsewhere (and might also be resentful, or envious, 
etc.). However, it would usually proactively impose more on people generally to not allow 
“first occupier” property claims: people would lose any investments they had made in the 
property and productive activity would be undermined. So “first occupier” ownership is 
proactive-imposition minimising (i.e., liberty maximising) as a strong ceteris paribus 
libertarian rule. But, in unusual or emergency situations, it is possible that “first occupier” 
ownership needs to be either completely waived or at least temporarily reduced. For instance, 
merely to be the first person to reach the sole natural water supply would not be enough to 
become its sole owner—as that would severely proactively impose on later-arriving people. 
And in the event of some natural disaster that meant that people needed to flee across other 
people‟s land, then a “first occupier” claim would not be enough to bar their way—as that 
would severely proactively impose on would-be escapees. This is because in both cases we 
have a pre-existing resource and not a benefit that the “first occupier” had created and was 
merely withholding access to. Thus this theory of liberty provides a better “objective, ethical, 
and non-arbitrary allocation of ownership in scarce resources.” (Strictly speaking, of course, 
what the liberty-maximising option is remains a factual matter; while affirming that option‟s 
desirability is a, completely separate, moral or value matter.) 
 K8 continues: 
 
property rights … are applicable only to scarce resources. Were we in a Garden of 
Eden where land and other goods were infinitely abundant, there would be no scarcity 
and, therefore, no need for property rules; property concepts would be meaningless. 
The idea of conflict, and the idea of rights, would not even arise. (31) 
 
This cannot be entirely correct, if only because people would still want to own themselves 
(even if they were one of “infinitely abundant” clones). And there would probably also be 
value attached to particular examples of things (“This is the very locket she gave me on that 
day”). So it is not clear that “property concepts would be meaningless” just because “goods 
were infinitely abundant” in a physical sense. Such reservations aside, scarcity is a good 
explanation of the desirability of property rules: those rules can maximise liberty (by 
minimising proactive impositions) with all the advantages of so doing. 
 However, it is another fundamental error to go on to assert that “The problem with IP 
rights is that the ideal objects protected by IP rights are not scarce” (31). This is an error 
because each ideal object is a particular thing. There is only one ideal object that is 
Pythagoras‟s Theorem, the number six, and Mahler‟s second symphony (which is not to 
imply that all these should be IP). And there is a finite supply of valuable “ideal objects” that 
currently exist; often with no close substitute for a particular one. K8 is not taking the theory 
of “ideal objects” seriously as particular “objects”. Infinitely more than one physical use or 
physical instantiation of an ideal object might be possible. But that does not show that there is 
more than one ideal object of that kind. It makes sense to say that there is an ideal object that 
is a particular poem. But there cannot be two or more ideal objects that are this same poem. 
They conceptually collapse into the same one ideal object. What K8 really means, of course, 
is simply that the physical use of an ideal object does not deprive other people of that ideal 
object‟s use in any way. But that is false as well, because one very important use for an ideal 
object just is to own it, and that ownership implies that the owner has control over its use.
4
 
K8 is advocating the non-ownership (or communism) of ideal objects. But that non-
ownership will cause a „tragedy of the commons‟ as regards many ideal objects: people will 
be less likely to attempt to produce (including by discovery) some ideal objects if they cannot 
own (exclusively control) them once they are produced. 
 Consider a physical analogy. Suppose I build a machine that can produce widgets 
using air and natural light. The machine is also powered by air and natural light and never 
needs repairing. I switch on the machine and in seconds I have a month‟s supply of widgets 
to sell in the nearby market. When I am not around, you come along and use the machine to 
make the same number of widgets and you promptly go and sell them in the market yourself. 
Furthermore, you intend to continue repeating the procedure because I am, somehow, unable 
to guard the machine adequately and you can always, somehow, beat me to the market. You 
assert that I have lost nothing, because I still have access to my machine, and to the widgets I 
made, and to as many more widgets as I want. However, I didn‟t produce the machine or the 
widgets for my personal use. I produced them solely in order to have something to sell. And 
now you have prevented that. Therefore, it is clearly false to claim that I have lost nothing 
and that my incentive to make such machines has not been undermined. And this appears to 
be sufficiently analogous with the position of many people who produce “ideal objects” with 
the intention of claiming them as IP. Perhaps this is generally fairly obvious and convincing 
to most people who consider such matters. Confusion mainly arises if we allow the crude and 
false, and „mutually reinforcing‟, assumptions that only physical things can really be 
property, that there is no scarcity involved with valuable ideas, and that both any alleged IP 
“justice” (20) or consequentialist need to “encourage the production of creative works and 
inventions” (21) must to be “justified” (passim)—which must not, in any case, constrain 
„real‟ PP. 
 K8 then makes a further error in asserting that “such property rights are not, and 
cannot be, allocated in accordance with the first occupier homesteading rule” (31-32). In fact, 
the first inventor or discoverer of an intellectual object could be regarded as a “first occupier 
homesteading” it. The only problem would be the even greater crudeness of that rule in this 
case. For, in order to avoid being a positive nuisance to (i.e., proactively imposing on) other 
people, it is necessary to time-limit the (sole) ownership to likely (or actual) independent 
invention or discovery. Some sort of legal procedure involving experts would probably be 
required to approximate the non-proactively-imposing length of a claim, and any claims 
would likely always be liable to later appeals. Any real second party, etc., would then share 
the IP. Otherwise, it would eventually revert to the public domain once there were only 
hypothetical further parties.  
One example K8 then gives us is this:  
 
If I invent a technique for harvesting cotton, your harvesting cotton in this way would 
not take away the technique from me. I still have my technique (as well as my cotton). 
Your use does not exclude my use; we could both use my technique to harvest cotton. 
There is no economic scarcity, and no possibility of conflict over the use of a scarce 
resource. Thus, there is no need for exclusivity. (32) 
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 Even if we suppose that ideal objects are somehow multiple, that multiple supply is still scarce in the sense that 
there are limited ownership rights of that supply: either particular people own it or it is not owned at all. 
Bearing in mind what has now been explained—and taking the possibility of IP seriously—
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 Or consider this remark in K8: 
 
Ideas are not naturally scarce. However, by recognizing a right in an ideal object, one 
creates scarcity where none existed before. (33) 
 
As we have seen, there is both a “natural” scarcity of valuable ideas generally and also a 
scarcity with a particular idea in that a denial of (proactive-imposition-minimising) producer-
ownership does deprive the producer of the intellectual asset he has created, and thereby a 
considerable part of the incentive to produce valuable ideas. Hence to deny such producer-
ownership is to exacerbate scarcity (in opportunity cost terms) among valuable ideas. Of 
course, in the very short term the abolition of IP would in some sense reduce scarcity. But 
this is relevantly and sufficiently similar to the way that a reduction in scarcity would occur if 
factories, warehouses, and shops were denied ownership of their physical products: any 
immediate increase in supply would very soon turn into greater scarcity than would otherwise 
have existed. 
 It is unnecessary to continue further with K8. The remainder of the text contains more 
repetition, plus quotations from texts expressing similar views, or material that is irrelevant to 




In its advocacy of “ideal object” (or meme) communism, K8 makes various significant errors 
throughout. The two main errors are assuming that only physical things can really be 
property, and that there is no scarcity involved with ideal objects. Many of the errors might 
have been avoided if only K8 had an explicit, non-moral, theory of interpersonal liberty by 
which to assess what is libertarian. In other words, K8 would not have had to resort to the old 
gallimaufry of dubious ad hoc assumptions presented as “libertarianism” if only it had taken 
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